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NOTES
REQUISITES OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARING-It is the legal duty of

administrative officers and commissions before making decisions on matters
within their authority to accord, in many situations, a hearing to any person
whose interests will probably be affected by their decision.' This duty is in
some situations imposed by a constitutional provision; in others it is required
by statutory or judicially-evolved rules of procedural law. To determine the
adequacy of a particular hearing granted by an administrative tribunal, the
desirability of protecting, by procedural safeguards, the private parties concerned is balanced against the desirability of promoting the efficiency of government by allowing its officers ample freedom in selecting the manner of
performing their public functions.2 More concretely, the hearing must be such
as is practicable and reasonable in the particular case,3 and yet afford interested
persons an opportunity to be heard effectively. 4 Inasmuch as the courts usually
consider the basic principles-if not all the applications-of common law procedure to be efficient tools "for the investigation judicially of the truth of a
matter in controversy" 5and for the protection of a party in interest, in practice
the question frequently becomes that of ascertaining whether the subject-matter
with which the particular tribunal deals,6 the effectual operation of the administrative machine,7 and the possible necessity for speedy action 8 admit, or whether
the importance of the determination to individuals apt to be prejudiced thereby 9
requires, the adoption of some particular element of common law procedure by
the administrative authorities.
Certain principles of procedure, such as the right to introduce oral or
written testimony or to cross-examine adverse witnesses, are considered so
fundamental by the courts as to be brought in certain instances within the concept of "due process of law",'" but more often the ratio decidendi is a general
obligation of the administrative tribunal to grant a fair and impartial hearing."
'The situations requiring a hearing are summarized in Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 96.
2 "When the government is dispensing a bounty, when it is admitting aliens, a proper
balancing of the interests involved leads the Supreme Court to give greater liberty to the
executive official; when vested rights, or personal liberty are involved, a more rigid control
is kept over executive officers. This results in having rules of one kind for the exercise of
the police power, of another for taxation, of another for aliens, of still another for the
operation of various kinds of public business," Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1921) 35 IARv.L. REv. 127, 153.
'Tomlinson v. Board of Equalization, 88 Tenn. I, 12 S. W. 414 (1889).
' San Christiana Investment Co. v. San Francisco, 16. Cal. 762, 141 Pac. 384 (1914).
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 457, 10 Sup. Ct.
,,62, 466 (189o).
'United States ex rel. Albro v. Karnuth, 31 F. (2d) 785 (W. D. N. Y. 1927).
'Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120.
'Brownlow v. Miers, 28 F. (2d) 6.53 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
'In Browne v. Zurbrick, 45 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) it is suggested that the Immigration Act of 1929, 46 STAT. 41, 8 U. S. C. A. § i8o (Supp. 1931), by making the attempt
of a deported alien to return to the United States a felony, may result in the interpretation
of the due process clause in a manner more favorable to the alien than heretofore.
" Constitutional inadequacy is customarily described as existing when the hearing is
"arbitrary or capricious", New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup.
Ct. 122 (917), or "manifestly unfair", Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 Sup. Ct.
566 (192o), or "not in good faith", Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 2& Sup. Ct.
2O1 (19o8). See Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86, 23 Sup. Ct. 611 (19o3).
" Frequently the question is one of interpreting a statutory requirement that there be a
"fair", "full", or "public" hearing; see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &

(878)
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In this respect the technique employed in determining the adequacy of a hearing
differs noticeably from that used in determining whether any hearing at all is
necessary, since for the latter purpose the test of constitutionality, rather than
the test of fair procedure, is commonly resorted to by American courts for
weighing private safeguards against public convenience. 12 Inexorable rigidity
would be introduced into the law if minute details of procedure were given the
security of constitutional guaranties, although many of these details may be of
sufficient importance in administrative hearings to warrant their protection by a
general rule of law.'3
Where a statute expressly stipulates the procedure to be followed by ad14
ministrative officers they are ordinarily held to strict compliance therewith.
Similarly an administrative tribunal must respect any general rules of practice
which it has promulgated for its own guidance.15 This accords with the doctrine
that a court of law cannot suspend its rules of court in a case falling within
them. If procedural regulations are prescribed for the tribunal by a superior
administrative authority they bind it with the force of law,'" and cannot be
arbitrarily suspended by the rule-making officer; a power to make general regulations is not tantamount to a power to regulate the conduct of individual cases.'
Permitting any procedural regulation to be dispensed with at will might lead to
unfair discriminations, and would also prevent a party from ascertaining in
advance how much of a hearing he would be able to secure.'
Nashville R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186 (1913) ; The New England Divisions
Case, 261 U. S. 184, 200, 43 Sup. Ct. 270, 277 (1923) ; Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. Co., 266 Ill. 567, 573, lO7 N. E. 841, 843 (1915).
When the statute prescribes no mode of inquiry, an administrative commission is
impliedly authorized to use any procedure that may reasonably be used in attaining the end
in view. United States ex rel. Roop v. Douglass, 19 D. C. 99 (189o).
". .. the elementary doctrine that the due process clause does not control the mere
forms of procedure provided only the fundamental requirements of notice and opportunity
to defend are afforded." Torres v. Lothrop, Luce & Co., 231 U. S. 171, 177, 34 Sup. Ct.
1O8, 110 (1913). Theseq fundamental requirements as applied to a hearing upon the withdrawal of a license to practice before the Department of the Interior were defined as including "specific charges, due notice of the same, an opportunity to make specific answers to
them, an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in support of them, an opportunity to
adduce testimony in contradiction of them, and an opportunity for argument upon the law
and facts." Garfield v. United States ex rel. Spalding, 32 App. D. C. 153, 158 (1908).
Similar requirements exist in deportation cases. Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F. (2d) 8o (C. C. A.
8th, 1924).
"The almost instinctive manner in which rules of common law procedure have sometimes been applied to administrative proceedings is illustrated by the decisions holding that
objections not made by counsel at the hearing will be considered waived on appeal to a
superior tribunal, judicial or administrative. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S.
117, 46 Sup. Ct. 215 (1926); Romeo v. Campbell, 35 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Ex
Parte Keizo Yamiyama, 44 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 9th, 193o); Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Ill.
466, 75 N. E. 184 (195o).
"'Chin Yow v. United States, supra note 1o; Wichita R. R. & Light Co. v. Public
Utility Commission, 26o U. S. 48, 43 Sup. Ct. 51 (1922) ; United States ex rel. Papa v. Day,
45 F. (2d) 435 (S. D. N. Y. 193o) ; In re Sugano, 40 F. (2d) 961, 962 (S. D. Cal. 193o) ;
cf. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336 (i892), holding a provision
empowering immigration officers to administer oaths and take testimony insufficient to make
the granting of hearings mandatory.
; Erie I R. v. City of Paterson, 79 N. J. L. 512, 76 Atl. io65 (191o) ; Stock v. Central Midwives
Board [1915] 3 K. B. 756.
"6Ex parte Bunji Une, 41 F. (2d) 239 (S. D. Cal. 1930) (rule permitting presence of
counsel during hearing prevents examination of witnesses in his absence).
' Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 192o).
""The one trend . . . clearly marked is the disposition in all independent administrative bodies to provide for hearing, and in many respects to adopt in some degree at least
the methods of regular courts." Nagle, Federal Departnmetal Practice, in GROWTH OF
A-MERICAN ADMNIsTIvTIE LAW (1923)

I75, 195.
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A hearing is not rendered inadequate merely because the taking of testimony
is delegated to a single member of the administrative tribunal, 19 or to an examiner, hearer, or investigator employed for this purpose.2 0 The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commission almost invariably use
one of these two methods of conducting a hearing, usually the latter. 2 1 The
commissioner or examiner hears the testimony and arguments submitted, and
reports them to the commission together, sometimes, with his own recommendations. Provided that the actual hearing be impartially conducted and the matters
there presented be fairly laid before the commission, and provided also that the
actual decision remains with those officers to whom the legislature has confided
it,22 such a hearing is lawful even though the legislature has not expressly
authorized delegation of the function of conducting hearings. 2 This procedure,
by separating the judicial function of deciding from the ministerial function of
collecting and arraying facts and arguments, permits a single administrative
body to dispose of a much larger amount of business than it would otherwise be
able to cover, and thereby enhances the capability of the personnel. Substantially, it is the procedure of the regular judiciary when a referee or master
is appointed. As applied in practice by most administrative tribunals an opportunity is allowed to present oral or written arguments to the full commission after the commissioner or examiner has reported.2 4 Without such an
opportunity the natural tendency of the tribunal to rely on its agent's recommendations might result in transferring the real function of decision to the
subordinate officer; where this opportunity is permitted a comparison of the
arguments with the recommendations normally should clearly present to the
tribunal the conflicts of facts and interests involved without examination of the
entire transcript of testimony. However, there appears to be no authority on
the point whether the right to make an argument before the full tribunal is
requisite to a fair hearing in cases where an opportunity to introduce and
criticize testimony, and to present all arguments has been allowed by the examiner.
Another effort to economize the tribunal's time may be seen in the doctrine
that a commission may, after a preliminary ex parte investigation, notify a
person to appear and show cause why a particular order should not be made; 25
if he appears and contests the propriety of the order, the authorities will then
be in a position to decide the matter on all the information properly before
" . W. Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 23 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 2d, I927);
Dodd v. Francisco, 68 N. J. L. 490, 53 Atl. 219 (19o2).
o People's U. S. Bank v. Gilson, 14o Fed. i (C. C. E. D. Mo. 19o5) ; Quon Quon Poy v.
Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 346 (1927).
"Fletcher, The Iinterstate Commerce Commission, in GROWTH OF AMERicAw ADMINIs61.
nATivE LA w (1923) 42, 66; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssIoN (924)
'-Earl & Wilson v. Raymond, 188 Ill. 15, 59 N. E. i (igoo) ; Dodd v. Francisco, supra
note 19. It is not improper for the commissioner who has conducted the hearing to participate
in the decision. J. W. Kobi Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 19.
"Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 152 Fed. 787 (C. C. E. D. Mo. i9o7); Smith v.
Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 56, 33 Sup. Ct. 6 (1912). The actual making. of the decision may be
delegated if power to do so is given by the legislature. Crane v. Nichols, I F. (2d) 33
(S. D. Tex. 1924). The Interstate Commerce Commission is expressly authorized by the
Commerce Act, 4o STAT. 271 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 17 (1928), to confer on its threemember divisions the same powers which the whole Commission might exercise. If the
officer conducting the hearing in effect abdicates control over the proceeding to the prosecuting officer, the hearing is inadequate. Colyer v. Skeffington, supra note 17.
Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 21, at 65 ; HENDERSON, op. Cit. supra note 21, at 70.
'Metropolitan Board of Health v. Heister, 37 N, Y. 661 (1868). The elaborate preliminary investigations conducted by the Federal Trade Commission before a complaint is
instituted are described in HENDERSON, oP. cit. supra note 21, at 49.
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them; 28 if he fails to appear,
he cannot thereafter complain of the want of an
27
opportunity to be heard.

Many administrative tribunals possess a limited power of compelling the
attendance of witnesses and the answering by them of legitimate questions
through the issuance of witness orders, obedience to which may be compelled by
the courts, 28 or disobedience made a crime.2 9 To whatever extent such power
has been conferred by statute a party to an administrative proceeding is usually
considered entitled to its exercise in his behalf within the same reasonable limits
as are observed in judicial proceedings. 30 This right, however, is secured by
rules of administrative procedure only, not by constitutional guaranties, since
even in formal trials at law the right to compulsory process for witnesses is not
within the definition of "due process of law". Accordingly, a hearing is not
rendered inadequate because the tribunal's lack of power to issue process, as
in the case of immigration boards, prevents interested persons from securing
testimony supporting -their contentions. 2 '
Similar rules have been applied to the administration of an oath to a
witness before an administrative tribunal in order to subject him to the penalties
of perjury if he tells an untruth. A party is entitled to have this added sanction
given to testimony offered by him if the tribunal is authorized to administer
oaths.32 Seemingly he should also have the right to insist that adverse testimony
be subjected to a like test, there being no great practical inconvenience in this.
While there are many decisions holding that an administrative tribunal empowered to administer oaths is not thereby precluded from acting on unsworn
testimony, 8 nevertheless, since in most of these cases the administration of an
oath does not seem to have been demanded at the time the information was
given, the right to put an adverse witness to his oath may possibly be judicially
affirmed in the future.
Conversely, neither want of power to compel the testimony of witnesses,
nor want of power to administer oaths relieves administrative authorities from
the duty of granting a hearing, however much they may detract from its completeness. 4
^0All interested parties who will be bound by the decision must be permitted to be present
during the entire hearing and to inspect all the evidence adduced against them. Farmers'
Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra note ii.
'Commonwealth v. Wall, 145 Mass. 216, 13 N. E. 486 (1887); Cobb v. Downing, i
S. W. (2d) 5o8 (Tex. I927), certiorari denied, 278 U. S. 646, 49 Sup. Ct. 8, (0928).
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 Sup. Ct. 1125 (1894);
see Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 417, 29 Sup. Ct. 115, 118
(19o8) ; In re Davies, 168 N. Y. 89, IOI, 61 N. E. 118, 121 (19O1) ; Lilienthal, The Power of
Government Agencies to Compel Testimmy (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 694.
' Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 16o, 47 Sup. Ct. 553
(1927).

'See Reynolds

note 21, at 70.

v. Schultz, 27 N. Y. Super. 282, 310

(1867) ;

HE NDERSON,

op. cit. supra

'lLow Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 32 Sup. Ct. 734 (1912). When administrative authorities have power to authorize the taking of, testimony abroad the denial of a
reasonable request to have presumably competent and material testimony so taken is unfair.
Young Bark You v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
'Kirby v. Transcontinental Oil Co., 33 S. W. (2d) 472 (Tex. 193o).
'Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904) (mailing
privileges) ; United States ex rel. Roop v. Douglass, supra note ii (liquor license) ; Phillips v. Ballinger, 37 App. D. C. 46 (1911) (disbarment from departmental practice) ; see
People ex rel. Am. Mfg. Co. v. Gifford, 134 Misc. 487, 489, 235 N. Y. Supp. 578, 581 (1929)
(taxation). Contra: People ex rel. Kasschau v. Board of Police Commissioners, 155 N. Y.
40, 49 N. E. 257 (1898) (hearing upon the removal of police officer must afford the accused
protection against falsehood through legal responsibility for perjury).
" State v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. L. 662 (1855); De Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918]
A. C. 557.
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Another matter now settled is that, in the absence of an express statutory
grant, a person cannot demand a rehearing to contest a decision reached after
an adequate hearing except by favor of the tribunal rendering the decision."5
A large group of cases is to be noted in which a variety of practices employed by administrative officials have been condemned by the courts on a mixed
constitutional and administrative law basis because unduly hampering a party
in making the most of his opportunity to be heard. Decisions involving such
questions are more frequent in exclusion and deportation cases than elsewhere,
possibly because the defenseless position of the suspected alien offers greater
temptations for petty official tyranny. For example, the courts have declared
it unlawful to prevent an alien held in detention from having access to counsel
for the purpose of preparing his case, 86 or from having a fair opportunity to
procure evidence in advance of the hearing.3 7 On the other hand it has been
held not unfair to question an alien privately after arrest in order to obtain
admissions for use at his hearing,38 at least if he has been warned that anything
said may be used against him.3 9 However, he must previously have been informed of the nature of the charge or had time to prepare to meet it.40 Exclusion
of the public, or the alien's witnesses, from his examination is permissible being
a precaution occasionally used in ordinary trials.4 But terroristic methods of
arrest, imprisonment and trial inducing an ignorant alien to make damaging
admissions at his hearing amount to a denial of due process. 42
Some years ago when immigration cases first began to come before the
courts the Supreme Court held that an alien, although constitutionally entitled
by reason of residence in the United States to a hearing before deportation, was
not deprived of due process through his inability to understand the language in
which the hearing was being conducted, or even to know that its purpose was
his deportation, no interpreter having been provided.4 The tendency of the
recent cases seems more liberal toward the alien. Thus the preceding decision
has been held inapplicable where actual conduct of the immigration officers was
responsible for the alien's ignorance through the employment of an incompetent
interpreter who misstated the questions asked the alien, and through the introduction of testimony in English without translation to afford an opportunity to
cross-examine. 44
Moreover in deportation cases the courts have in some instances exacted
from administrative authorities the performance of affirmative duties directed
towards aiding the alien in the presentation of his case. An inspector who has
uncovered important evidence possibly favorable to the alien is bound to reveal
it in his report to the commissioner having the ultimate power of decision lest
non-inclusion mislead him into giving too great weight to the inspector's recommendations. 5 And where an alien makes inconsistent statements through an
Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 354 U. S. 421, 14 Sup. Ct. 1114 (1894);
Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Powers, 138 Fed. 257 (C. C. W. D. Mich. I9O5) ; Houston
Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Commission, i9 S. W. (2d) 583 (Tex. 1929).
'Chew Hay Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 9th, I918).
Chin Yow v. United States, supra note Io.
Chan Wong v. Nagle, 17 F. (2d) 987 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; EXr parte Vilarino, 47
F. (2d) 912 (S. D. Cal. i93o).
"See Ex parte Keizo Yamiyama, supra note 13, at 5o6. But cf. In re Kozopud, 272
Fed. 330 (N. D. Ohio i92o).
40 Ungar v. Seaman, supra note 32.
"United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 463, 24 Sup. Ct. 623 (19o4).
' Colyer v. Skeffington, supra note 17.
"Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, supra note 3o.
" Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 6th, i93o).
"Kwock Jan Fat v. White, supra note io.
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failure to point out the discrepancy for explanation
interpreter at his hearing
46
denies a fair hearing.
The right to state one's case to the administrative .officers, unaided by
counsel or the independent testimony of witnesses, is an element implicit in the
concept of a hearing.47 This was once the sole requisite of a customs hearing
under the decisions of the Supreme Court holding valid treasury regulations
denying importers the right to offer evidence or to be present at the appraisement, provided they were allowed to state the value of their goods and other
relevant facts to the appraisers .4 These decisions are to be explained on the
ground that the power of Congress to exclude imports entirely or to impose any
condition on importation led the Court to infer that Congress in enacting that
appraisements should be made "by all reasonable ways and means" intended to
exert its power by empowering the Treasury to judge of the reasonableness of
the appraisement. Governmental necessity for revenue seems an inadequate
explanation since a fuller hearing is customarily permitted in taxation cases.
However, Congress, in 1913, by expressly providing for the introduction of
evidence and the presence of counsel at customs hearings, abolished their
peculiar status in this respect. 49 Logically there seems no reason why cases
falling within the so-called "plenary power" of Congress over aliens and imports
should be treated differently from other administrative law problems where the
question involved is not what Congress can do, but what it has done. 0
Outside of customs appraisements the right to present oral and documentary
testimony has been almost invariably required by the courts as an element of
fair procedure."' If it be conceded that a main purpose of the hearing system
is to inform the administrative tribunal to the end that its decision may be
rendered with a full knowledge of the facts and interests involved, a procedure
which denies the right to produce independent testimony is hardly more than
the shadow of a hearing. Even though the party himself has full information
his testimony does not speak with the same cogency and reliability as that of a
disinterested witness testifying from personal knowledge. Some decisions consider assessment cases as not subject to this rule because the decision of the
assessor, being based on his valuation of an object personally examined by him,
normally rests to a much greater extent on personal knowledge and experience
than other administrative decisions; hence they have held the hearing of evidence to be discretionary with the assessor.52 Yet in assessments independent
evidence is useful as a check on the accuracy of the assessor's judgment.
The decisions of the Supreme Court leave in doubt the question whether
the right to present a written statement of objections to an administrative
tribunal satisfies the requirement of due process, or whether there must also
be opportunity to make an oral argument and to furnish oral proof. In San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City I the presentation of a sworn written
statement of revenue and expenses was apparently considered adequate in a
"0Gonzales v. Zurbrick, mepra note 44.
'Waye v. Thompson, 15 Q. B. D. 342 (1885).
"Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310, II Sup. Ct. 103 (i89o) ; Origet v. Hedden, 155
U. S. 228, I5 Sup. Ct. 92 (1894).
'938 STAT. I86, iq U. S. C. A. § 381 (1927).
' Chin Yow v. United States, scpra note 10.
"Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra note ii (public utility
service) ; Dullam v. Wilson, 53 Mich. 392, ig N. W. 112 (884) (removal of public officer);
see United States v. Sing Tuck, supra note 41, at i6!, 24 Sup. Ct. at 623 (immigration).
' Tomlinson v. Board of Equalization, supra note 3. Contra: Kirby v. Transcontinental
Oil Co., supranote 32.
M 74 U. S. 739, ig Sup. Ct. 904 (1899). A written presentation was seemingly considered adequate for assessment purposes in Lander v. Mercantile Bank, I86 U. S. 458, 22
Sup. Ct. 908 (1902).
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public utility rate regulation proceeding. But in Londoner v. Denver 54 the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by the restriction of a
hearing upon local improvement assessments to the presentation of written objections, saying, "But even here a hearing in its very essence demands that he
who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument
however brief, and, if need be, by proof however informal." "
The common law considers the cross-examination of an adverse witness
so essential to the elucidation of truth that it does not permit offered testimony
to be considered evidence until opportunity has been had for cross-examination.
Consequently the courts regard the right to cross-examine at administrative
hearings one to be zealously guarded,56 or even to be brought within the constitutional guaranty of due process.W Assessors are sometimes permitted to
consider unsworn information without affording opportunity for cross-examination because of the relative insignificance of testimony in such proceedings as
compared with the personal knowledge and skill of the assessor." Th outright
denial of cross-examination in customs proceedings, founded in the fear that
revelation of their identity might deter witnesses from giving information, 9 was
ended by the Act of 1913.

o

Corollary to the right of cross-examination is the rule that affidavits taken
in a party's absence are incompetent evidence where it is possible to call the
affiants personally; ". the rule that nothing can be considered as evidence which
is not introduced as such; 12 and the rule that information given by outsiders,
even under a stipulation as to secrecy, cannot be considered by the administrative
tribunal in making its decisions unless revealed to the party. 8 Further, there
must be opportunity to
criticize the probative force of the evidence and to adduce
64
testimony in rebuttal.

The English courts, however, have materially qialified the rule requiring
revelation of all adverse testimony by excepting from its operation the reports
of an investigator employed by the administrative tribunal. In the famous
M210 U. S. 373, 28 Sup. Ct. 708 (i9o8).
These decisions may be reconciled on the
ground that the fixing of the rate in the former was a legislative act requiring no hearing
save as provided by statute, although this is not mentioned in the decision, whereas the
assessment in the latter was clearly a judicial act. Accord: Hitchcock v. Smith, supra
note 23 (mailing privileges) ; Erie R. R. v. City of Paterson, supra note 15; Dullam v.
Wilson, supra note 51; Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Pierce, 122 Ore. 337, 255 Pac. 603 (1927).
210 U. S. at 386, 28 Sup. Ct. at 714. The Interstate Commerce Commission invariably
allows oral argument before the full tribunal or one of its divisions. Fletcher, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 66. "On principle, it would seem that in certain cases especially where human
liberty is involved, the oral hearing is intrinsically more just while, on the other hand, where
rights of property are concerned, not infrequently the submission of written evidence and
printed argument may result equally well in obtaining justice." Albertsworth, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 131.
' Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra note iI.
'Hitchcock v. Smith, supra note 23; Gonzales v. Zurbrick, supra note 44 ; Garfield v.
United States ex tel. Spalding, supra note 12.
'American Express Co. v. Raymond, 189 Ill 232, 59 N. E. 528 (19Ol).
" Supra note 48.
' Supra note 49. The right to cross-examine is also expressly given by the Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1923, 42 STAT. 161, 7 U. S. C. A. § 193 (1927).
'Ungar v. Seaman, supra note 12; Ex parte Keizo Yamiyama, supra note 13. Failure
to demand an opportunity to cross-examine at the hearing does not validate a deportation
order based on such evidence where alien is unaided by counsel, Gonzales v. Zurbrick, supra
note 44, or where witness is still available when demand is made. Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F.
(2d)

835 (C. C. A. 9th,

1928).

'United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 268 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565 (1924);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831 (1929).
' Chew Hay Quong v. White, supra note 36; Romeo v. Campbell, supra note 13.
"Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra note II; see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., supra note II, at 93, 33 Sup. Ct. at 187;
De Verteuil v. Knaggs, supra note 34, at 560.
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Arlidge 15 case the Local Government Board refused to reveal the report of an
inspector who had examined certain premises alleged to be unfit for habitation,
had conducted a hearing as to their habitability, and had decided that they were
unfit for use. The House of Lords upheld this refusal on the ground that the
demoralization of departmental discipline and routine which might possibly
result from the revelation of an official report outweighed the benefit which the
owner of the premises would gain through inspection of the report; and also
that the direct responsibility of the board to Parliament was both a safeguard
against misuse of its powers, and a reason for believing that Parliament had
intended to give the Board a wide discretion in regulating its procedure. The
American cases in which this point has arisen generally reject the English
doctrine. 6 The executive influence has so far prevailed in these matters as to
permit administrative tribunals to act upon the reports of their officers, and even
to accord peculiar weight thereto; 7 it largely remains to be seen how far the
judicial influence will extend in the direction of limiting the tribunal's free use
of such reports.
In the event that the fairness of the preliminary investigation is brought in
issue, as where it is asserted that the investigator extorted an admission by
improper means, it has been held that the party affected must be granted the
right of cross-examining the investigator himself at a hearing before the full
tribunal, and that if the preliminary proceedings were unfair the information
so obtained must be eliminated from the tribunal's consideration, so as to preserve the constitutional immunity against self-incrimination. s
In the somewhat similar situation where papers from the tribunal's files,
not forming part of the record in the pending case, such as annual reports filed
with a public service commission by a utility corporation, or records of other
proceedings, are to be considered by the tribunal the weight of authority requires
that these papers be formally offered in evidence or otherwise brought to the
attention of the interested party in order that he may have an opportunity to
criticize and rebut them.69 It would obviously work great hardship to require
him to meet beforehand all matters possibly bearing on his contentions contained
in the tribunal's voluminous files as well as waste the latter's time. Nor is it
enough for the tribunal to give a general notice that it expects to consider all
relevant matters contained in its files; it must specifically refer to particular
records, 70 unless this requirement is waived by a failure to object. Although
entitled to see all data considered by the tribunal the party is not entitled to
search its records prior to his hearing merely on the possibility that they may
contain something favorable to his case. 7 However, either the private party or
the government may base an argument upon filed papers by reference thereto,
'Rex v. Local Government Board [1914] I K. B. 16o; Local Government Board v. Arlidge, supra note 7; cf. Board of Education v. Rice [igi] A. C. 179.
' Ungar v. Seaman, supra note 12; Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,
supra note ii; Sabre v. Rutland R. R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 Atl. 693 (1913) ; see Yudelson v.
Andrews, 25 F. (2d) 8o, 84 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Note (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 198.
'United States ex rel. Roop v. Douglass, supra note ii.
'Ungar v. Seaman, supra note 12; In re Sugano, supra note 14.
' Illinois Central R. R. v. Railroad Commission, i F. (2d) 8o5 (E. D. Ky. 1924) ; West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 42 F. (2d) 899 (N. D. Ohio 1928) ; Steamboat
Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185 Fac. 8ol (ig91) ; see United States v., B. & 0.
Southwestern R. R., 226 U. S. 14, 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 5, 6 (1912). Contra: Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Railroad Commission, 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1914); a fortiori where

the records are those of another tribunal. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Commerce
Commission, supra note 62.
'United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry., supra note 62.
1 United States ex rel. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
264 U. S. 64, 44 Sup. Ct. 294 (1924).
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without formally offering7 them in evidence, since a tribunal may take judicial
notice of its own records. 1
Another difficulty encountered in applying the rule requiring revelation of
adverse testimony is that administrative tribunals, unlike courts, may, and often
do, act on their, own personal knowledge of facts relating to the particular case
before them unless this has been forbidden by the legislature.78 To deprive the
tribunal of the right to act on personal knowledge would in many cases deprive
the system of administrative tribunals of one of its chief merits, its investigatory
function. 4 On the other hand to permit it to proceed- on its own undisclosed
information places a party under the disadvantage of having no opportunity to
rebut, correct, or criticize this information. Partly for this reason the Supreme
Court has held that the statutory requirement of a hearing before the Interstate
Commerce Commission prevents that body from deciding on the basis of personal knowledge.7 5 A few decisions have adopted an intermediate rule to the
effect that the tribunal, if it takes matters of personal knowledge into consideration, must inform a party of the facts known to it and permit him to criticize
and rebut them before proceeding to decide the case.78 Other courts
77 apparently
permit decision on the basis of the tribunal's unrevealed knowledge.
A party to an administrative proceeding is ordinarily allowed to be represented by counsel throughout the hearing.78 The one exception is in the hearings
'Lui

Tse Chew v. Nagle, 15 F.

(2d)

636 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ; United States v. Los

Angeles & S. L. R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 47 Sup. Ct. 413 (1927); Ex parte Keizo Kami-

yana, supra note 13; Anderson v. Board of Dental Examiners, 27 Cal. App. 336,
149 Pac. ioo6 (1915) ; People ex rel. Pesny v. Board of Excise, 17 Misc.
98, 4o N. Y. Supp. 741 (18g6). Testimony taken at a former hearing in the same case
or with respect to the same individual may be considered without a second opportunity to
inspect and contradict it. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S.673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359 (1912) ; Yee
Chun v. Nagle, 35 F. -(2d) 839 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), even though the personnel of the tribunal
has since changed. How Moon Ong v. Nagle, 32 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929). Faris,
Judicial Notice by Administrative Bodies (Q928) 4 IND. L. J. 167, takes the view that findings of fact in similar cases from the tribunal's records should be considered conclusive unless
rebutted by different evidence from that presented in the earlier case.
'State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875) ; State ex rel. Early v. Wunderlich,
144 Minn. 368, 175 N. W. 677 (1920) (removal of school teacher) ; see Raudenbusch's Appeal,
12o Pa. 328, 342, 14 Atl. 148, 150 (1888) (liquor license). Contra: State ex rel. McAleer v.
French, 11 N. Y. 502. 23 N. E. io6i (189o) (removal of police officer).

I'Data collected in other investigations are a form of personal knowledge and are entitled
to consideration for the same reasons. City of Elizabeth v. Public Utility Commissioners, 99
N. J. L. 496, 123 Atl. 358 (1924).

Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S.:258, 44 Sup. Ct. 317 (1924) ; Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. v. Commerce Commission, supra note 62; Note (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 831. But
unrevealed personal knowledge may be considered in mailing privilege cases. Bates & Guild
Co. v. Payne, i94 U. S. io6, 24 Sup. Ct. 595 (1904).
" State ex rel. Meader v. Sullivan, 58 Ohio St. 504, 51 N. E. 48 (1898) ; see United
States v. B. & 0. Southwestern R. R., supra note 69, at 20, 33 Sup. Ct. at 6; State ex ret.
Medical College v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 517, lO7 N. W. 500, 516 (I9O6) ; Farris, op. cit.
supra note 72, at 177.
' An administrative tribunal may properly make use of its knowledge of scientific principles and theories relating to the subject-matter with which it deals. Stennerson v. Great
Northern R. R., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713 (1897).
The Pennsylvania law is thus summed up in Hoffman v. Public Service Commission, 99
Pa. Super. 417, 428 (103o): "'Mere admission by an administrative tribunal of matters
which, under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, would be deemed incompetent, does not invalidate an order made by it': Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States,
28o U. S. 42o. . . . All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be
considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents
and to offer evidence in rebuttal. . . . But an administrative tribunal may take notice of
results reached by it in other cases, when its doing so is made to appear in the record and
the facts thus noted are specified so that matters of law are saved."
'Denial of this right in a proceeding to deport a resident alien puts upon the imnmigration authorities the burden of scrupulously regarding the alien's rights and of explaining
the denial. E.v parte Chin Loy You, 223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass. 1915). Permitting a resident
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accorded by statute to aliens who have no constitutional right to a hearing, that
is, to immigrants who present no substantial evidence of citizenship and who
have not become a part of the population of the United States by actual entry.70
A provision that such aliens might have one "friend or relative" present at their
hearing was interpreted as excluding counsel, on the theory that the exclusive
power of Congress over immigration negatived implied limitations on the methods
employed by the immigration officers in carrying out the duties entrusted to
them by Congress. 0
In the absence of departmental regulation it is unnecessary that the party
be apprised of his right to counsel. 8' But an adequate hearing was held denied
when an inspector, after formally complying with regulations requiring a resident alien to be informed of his right to counsel in deportation proceedings,
mistakenly advised the alien that his case did not warrant the employment of
counsel thereby causing him to lose the opportunity
of submitting a brief to the
2
officer having the ultimate power of decision.
Viewing through a broad perspective the decisions exploring the essentials
of a hearing they are seen to center around the primary doctrine that an administrative hearing must be adequate and fair.u3 The variances in specific
applications of this doctrine appear to result either from the sanction-whether
constitutional, judicial, legislative, or administrative-securing the requirement
of a fair and adequate hearing;"' or from the practical considerations differentiating administrative proceedings on the basis of subject matter; or from
the extension of principles originally devised for other purposes, as the separation
of powers theory, to the field of administrative law.
H.J.S.

EVIDENTIARY

VALUE OF FINGER-PRINTS-Due

to a marked increase in

scientific knowledge concerning the nature and importance of finger-prints, the
time is not far distant when courts must closely scrutinize and properly evaluate
the probative force to be given to evidence that finger-prints found on the scene
of a crime correspond with those of the accused.
The first appellate court decision on finger-prints in this country, People v.
fennings,' remains the leading American case on the subject.2 Defendant was
alien to have counsel only when a certain stage in the proceedings is reached does not deny

due process of law if counsel is permitted to meet evidence previously introduced. Low Wah
Suey v. Backus, supra note 31; Plane v. Carr, i F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
' United States ex tel. Buccino v. Williams, i9o Fed. 897 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1911); Brownlow v. Miers, supri note 8; United States ex rel. Wong Sai Chain v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 F. (2d) 526 (S. D. N. Y. 193o).
' United States ex rel. Albro v. Karnuth, supra note 6.
'Low Wah Suey v. Backus, supra note 31 ; Gonzales v. Zurbrick, supra note 44.
' Roux v. Commissioner of Immigration, 2o3 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).
Accordingly, an administrative decision will not be reversed unless the error was
prejudicial. Ex parte Pouliot, 196 Fed. 437 (E. D. Wash. 1912) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
supra note io; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 565
(1924); Federal Trade Commission v. Goodgrape Co., 45 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o);
State ex rel. Hardstone Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174 Minn. 200, 219 N. W.
81 (1928).
' Often a decision is placed on several sanctions simultaneously, as in Colyer v. Skeffington, supra note 17.
1252 Ill. 534, 96 N. E. 1077, 43 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1206 (1911).
The decision is well-reasoned and complete. In this respect it contrasts strongly with
the leading English decision on finger-prints, Castleton's Case, 3 Crim. App. 74 (igo9), in
which the accused was not defended at the trial. The opinion in Castleton's Case contains
only a few lines and cites neither legal nor scientific authority in support of finger-print
evidence, although the conviction was based solely on such evidence.
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on trial for murder. A strong web of circumstantial evidence was built around
him, and in addition, finger-print experts testified that his finger-prints were
identical with those found on a freshly painted railing in the house where the
crime was committed. The court was faced squarely with the question of the
admissibility of finger-print evidence. After stating that it could find no
American statutes or cases in point, 3 the court cited an English case as precedent,4
and referred to scientific writers to show that the finger-print system of identification was reliable. 5 The court also relied greatly upon the testimony of four
finger-print experts at the trial. Having demonstrated that there was a scientific
basis for the use of finger-prints to prove identity, the court found the evidence
admissable under the general common law rule that whatever tends to prove
any material fact is relevant and competent. 6
Strictly construed, the case of People v. JenningsI stands for the proposition that the court will take judicial notice of the fact that the finger-prints of
any individual are so distinctive as to permit their use for the purposes of
identification. Later courts have gone further, and have expressly declared that
the finger-prints of no two individuals are identical." The doctrine of the uniqueness of finger-prints can be traced back to Sir Francis Galton, a pioneer in the
study of finger-prints, who declared that the chances of duplication are one in
64 billions.9 Galton reached this estimate by applying the mathematical theory
of probability to the number of points of identity in a perfect finger-print. 10
Since then, huge numbers of finger-prints have been collected and studied, and
no instance of duplication has been discovered.
It is true that finger-prints found at the scene of a crime, and used to detect
the criminal, are generally imperfect, and contain fewer points of identity than
do perfect prints. But although the chances of duplication are immensely
greater for imperfect prints than for perfect prints, they are still small enough
to be disregarded for all practical purposes. It may be safely stated that even
imperfect finger-prints found at the scene of a crime correspond to the fingerprints of only one individual in the world."'
Not only are the finger-prints of any individual unique, but they also remain
constant throughout life. Eminent authority has stated:
"There is and can be absolutely no change during life, either in .
the individual ridges .

.

. nor in the details of the ridges. 2

' The Jennings case was preceded by several lower court cases in Which finger-print
evidence was involved. The Crispi case, decided in 1911, is often cited as the first instance
in this country of a conviction on finger-prints. In that case, the'defendant confessed during
trial, after the finger-prints had been introduced in evidence. For a discussion of this, and
other early cases, see Kinsley, Finger Print Identification as Sole Evidentce (1911) 2 3.
('RaM. L. 407; WILDER AND WENTWORTH, PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (igi) 286; FINGER
PRINT EVIDENCE (Dept. of the Navy, Bureau of Navigation, 1920) ; Reeve, The Infallible
Finger-Print,HARPER'S WEEKLY, July 4, I913, p. 19.
Castleton's Case, supra note 2.
The authorities cited are: FuLD, POLICE ADMINISTRATION, 342; GROSS, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION (Adams' Trans. i9o6) 277; OSBORN, QUESTIONED DOCUmTS (1910) 479;

1O ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (iith ed.) 376; 5 NELsoN's ENCYCLOPEDIA 28.

'For a discussion of this point, see Larwill, Finger-PrintEvidence (1912) 5 LAw. AND
BANK. 304; (1915) 15 CoL. L. REV. 714; (1912) I0 MICH. L. REV. 396.
7Supra note I.
8 Stacey v. State, 292 Pac. 885 (Okla. 1930).
Galton, Finger Prints (1892) iO.
10 Galton's estimate is generally accepted although it is recognized as being far from
accurate. For other estimates of the chances of duplication, and a discussion of the methods
used in reaching them, see WILDER AND WENTwORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 321. See also,
WEEDE AND BEFFEL, FINGER PRINTS CAN BE FORGED (1924) 16.
'See UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1923) § 815; WILDER AND WENTWORTH,

op. cit. supra note 3, at 129; GROSS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 278.
"WILDER AND WENTWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 130.
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But it was early pointed out by Galton that the appearance of a finger-print may
change over a period of years.
"It must be emphasized that it is in the minutiae and not in the measurable dimensions of any portion of the pattern that this remarkable persistence is observed, not even if the measurements be made in units of the
ridges. The patterns of the fingers may vary with the fatness, leanness,
usage, gouty deformities or age." 1Since identification is made by means of what Galton calls the "minutiae" which
remain constant, the danger of error due to variations in the pattern is small.
The possibility of forging finger-prints was not discussed in the Jennings
case 14 but the attitude which prevailed at the time the precedents were being set
is indicated by the following dictum:
"A finger-print is therefore in reality an unforgeable signature." 15
As early as 1913, however, it had been intimated that finger-prints could be
forged, 16 but it was not until the publication of an article by Milton Carlson,"7
a handwriting expert with wide court experience, that the possibility received
general publicity. Mr. Carlson, commenting on a recently decided case '8 in
which finger-prints played a large part, declared that he had discovered a means
of forging finger-prints, but did not make public his method. Professor Wigmore, referring to Mr. Carlson's statement, says:
"but as the method itself has been kept secret by the inventor, its practical
availability must be doubted." 19
Another comment upon the same article points out its true significance:
"The possibility of forgery is not of course sufficient to exclude fingerprint evidence . . . but the possibility must be borne in mind by bench

and bar lest undue weight be given to the print."

20

But finger-print experts and police officials remained skeptical and clung
to their belief in the reliability of the finger-print.2 1 Even the following broad
hint as to the method of forging finger-prints failed to budge them from their
position:
"Everyone having a knowledge of the subject knows that any line
design that can be photographed may be exactly reproduced as far as the
mere picture of the pattern is concerned." 2
In 1924, with the publication of Wehde & Beffel's book, Finger Prints Can Be
Forged, all doubts on the subject were set aside, for in this book Mr. Wehde
clearly describes the method of forging finger-prints.2 Although Mr. Wehde's
GALToN, op. cit. supra note 9, quoted in UNDERH IL, op. cit. supra note II, at 1119.
"Supra note I.
Parker v. Rex, 14 C. L. R. 681, 3 B. R. C. 68 (Australia i912).
"See WEHDE AND BEFFL, op. cit. supra note IO,at 74.
'
Carlson, Cipt Finger Prints be Forged? (1919) 89 CENT. L. J. 448. The same article
also appeared in (192o) ii J. CRib. L. 141 and (1920) 5 VA. L. REC. (N. s.) 765.
' The name of the case is not given.
"I WIGMtoR, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 414 n. 3.
- Forging Finger Prints (1920) 23 LAtw NOTES 203.
' See WEHDE AND BE"Ei., op. cit. supra note 10, at 75.
- Melcher, The Skin. Game (1923) 13 J. CRIm. L. 587, 589.
' The method is described in chapter 14.
'3
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method demands considerable technical skill, it is so obvious that it is remarkable
that any belief in the unforgeability of finger-prints ever existed.
Before considering the effect of the possibility of forgery upon the value
of finger-print evidence, it may be well to mention another aspect of the subject.
It is well known that almost any smooth-surfaced object will receive the imprint
of the fingers of a person who touches it. Literally millions of finger-prints are
made every day under the most innocent of circumstances, so that there is no
necessary connection between finger-prints and criminals.
With this in mind, finger-prints may be classified on the basis of whether
the accused did or did not have innocent means of access to the place in which
the prints were found.
Finger-prints of the first class consist generally of those found in public
places. Such finger-prints found after the commission of a crime at most point
to the presence at the scene of the crime of the person with whose finger-prints
they coincide. Presence at what time? This cannot be ascertained by an inspection of the finger-prints. The prints may have been made before, during, or
after the commission of the crime. The mathematical probabilities are strongly
against the presumption that the prints were made at the time the crime was
committed. Again, since a number of persons have had access to the place
where the print was found, the mathematical probabilities are also strongly
against the presumption that the print was made by the person who committed
the crime. When considered from this viewpoint, the value of such finger-print
evidence appears to be slight. It is gratifying to find the courts recognizing this.
In McGarvy v. State," finger-prints were found on a glass which had been
broken in order to effect entrance into a building. The glass was exposed to the
public. The court set aside the conviction for burglary as unsupported by the
evidence.
The following charge to a jury, in Garcia v. State," was approved by the
appellate court:
"The jury are instructed that, even if you believe the finger or thumb
print found upon the piece of glass introduced in evidence is the finger or
thumb print of defendant Garcia, if you find the glass was in an exterior
public place, where said defendant had a right to go in discharge of his
duty, and if reasonable doubt of defendant Garcia's guilt arises in your
mind

from

Garcia."

such hypothesis

.

. . you should

acquit

the

defendant

26

In People v. Van Cleave,17 the defendant's finger-print had been found on
a trunk from which some articles had been stolen. Defendant had previously
had innocent access to the trunk. The court said that it was possible to infer
that the print was made at the time of the crime, but2 that the evidence was not
as satisfactory as the prosecution might have desired.
In State v. Steffen, 29 it was held error to permit in evidence prints found
on a glass which had been broken by a burglar until a reasonable foundation
had been laid to show that the glass was in such a position that it might have been
touched by the burglar at the time of the crime.
Thus, when faced squarely with the problem, courts have not been slow in
recognizing that at least some finger-print evidence is of little or no value.
-82 Tex. Crim. 597, 200 S. W. 527 (1918).

26 Ariz. 597, 229 Pac. 103 (1924).
The conviction was affirmed in this case, but there was other evidence to support it.
"276 Pac. 641 (Cal. 1929).
Although the supporting evidence was held sufficient to sustain the verdict, the conviction was reversed on other grounds.
C226 N. W. 46 (Iowa 1929).
'
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Finger-prints of the second class, those found in places to which the accused
did not have innocent means of access, present a different problem. If the
finger-prints are found on a portable object left behind by the criminal, it is
possible, and in view of the ingenuity of criminals, not at all improbable, that
they were unknowingly made by an innocent person, and deliberately "planted"
by the criminal in order to divert suspicion from himself. If the finger-prints
are found on an immovable object, or on a portable object which was not
brought to the scene of the crime by the criminal, the possibility of "planting"
may be discarded. There remains, however, the possibility of forgery.
The courts have not discussed these possibilities or their effect upon the
value of finger-print evidence. Since the finger-prints do not disclose when
and where they were made, and since there is no method by which their genuineness can be determined, 30 it is clear that they are not conclusive proof of the
presence at the scene of the crime of the individual they identify. It is submitted that they do not prove such presence beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that they are insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused.
Despite the possibilities of "planting" and forgery, the rule laid down in
People v. Jennings,3 ' that finger-prints are admissible in evidence to prove
82
identity, still remains. The weight of the finger-print evidence is for the jury.
There is real danger in the prevalent naive faith in the infallibility of fingerprints. As has been pointed out by an earnest and painstaking student of the
subject:
"The . . . [use of finger-prints found at the scene of a crime] . . .

has taken the deepest hold of the popular imagination, and has seemed to
me at least, to threaten danger to the innocent by its often ignorant and
unscientific application." 83
The danger lies in the tendency of jurors to consider finger-prints clear and
controlling evidence of guilt.
A consideration of the cases deals a severe blow to one's belief in the
ingenuity of criminal lawyers. With the case of People v. Jentings3 4 as a
notable exception, most of the finger-print cases have been argued by lawyers
who seem to have been firmly convinced of the guilt of their clients, and whose
powers of analysis were apparently paralyzed by the fascinating patterns so
confidently displayed by the prosecution. To this, and to ignorance, rather than
to any well-founded and unalterable belief, may be attributed the attitude of
jurors towards finger-print evidence.3 5 Undoubtedly, a cause celebre, ably
argued, will sweep away the misconceptions, and bring to the public a true
realization of the value of finger-print evidence. Until such a case appears,
"Mr. Melcher in his article, The Skin Game, supra note 22, recognizing the possibility
of forging finger-prints, indicates a method of detecting such forgeries. It consists (i) of
examining the suspected print under a microscope in order to see whether it was imprinted
by human skin, and (2) of examining the impressions left by the pores as well as the
pattern of the fingers. However a forged print can be made with a substance having the
characteristics of human skin, and a forged finger-print will contain the impressions of the
pores as well as a genuine finger-print.
" Supra note i.
'UNDERHILL, op. cit. supra note ii, at § 815.
Faulds, Finger Prints, SciENTIFic AmERICAN SUPPLElMNT, Nov. I8, 1911, at 326.

Supra note I.
'Finger-prints in the notorious Arbuckle case were pronounced forgeries by an expert
for the defense. The defendant was acquitted. See Carlson, Dangers of Finger Print Identification (1923) 9 VA. L. RE. (N. s.) 163.
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judges should make it their duty to check the tendency to overevaluate fingerprint evidence, and to prevent miscarriages of justice resulting from such overevaluation.
B.F.

DISRMEGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY

IN

TAX CAsEs-That a corporation

has, in legal effect, an artificial individuality separate and distinct from that of
its stockholders is a cardinal doctrine of the law of corporations. 1 To Chief
Justice Marshall, in the Dartmouth College Case,2 is ascribed its first official
pronouncement, but since the occasion of that classic utterance, legal authorities
have been engaged in a spirited controversy as to the character of this separate
entity.3 It has been variously adjudged a fact, 4 a fiction,' a method 6 and even
an entity akin to a human personality.7 It will serve no useful purpose to cast
another vote in favor of any party to the dispute,8 for be it fact or fiction,
person or thing, a corporation by virtue of its franchise enjoys certain privileges
and possesses certain attributes of a legal person, quite apart from the stock1Pullman's

Palace Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 115 U. S. 587, 6 Sup. Ct.

194

(1885);

Donnell v. Herring-Hall Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267, 28 Sup. Ct. 288 (igo8) ; Commonwealth v. Sunbury Converting Works, 286 Pa. 545, 134 Atl. 438 (1926); Donaldson v.
Andresen, 30o Pa. 312, 15o Atl. 616 (193o); Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley,
L. R. [i9o6] 2 K. B. 856, aff'd, L. R. [19o8] 2 K. B. 89, I CooK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed.
1923) § I; BALLANTINE, M

IuAL OF CORPORATION LAw (193o)

§ 5;

I FLETrcHER, CORPORA-

(Perm. ed. 1931) § 25; I THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 9.
'Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518, 636 (1819).
'WORmSER, THE DISREGARD OF TEE CORPORA.T FICTION AND ALLED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 01927) ; Note (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 254; Machen, Corporate Personality (1911) 24
HARV. L. REV. 253, 347; Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
(1925) 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12.
'Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, supra note 3, at
20; Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the CorporateEntity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REV.
128; WORMSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7. "There is in many cases much loose talk about
ignoring the corporate fiction and looking at the substance rather than the form. But the
corporate capacity is a legal fact, not a fiction." BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note I, at 26.
'Procter & Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fed. 1013 (S. D. N. Y. 1923). Chief Justice
Marshall evidently took this view in the Dartmouth College case, supra note 2, where
he defined a corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible and existing only in
contemplation of law." He is thought to have been influenced by Lord Coke's definition in
Case of Sutton's Hospital, IO Co. I, 32 (1613) which refers to a corporation as "invisible,
immortal and resting only in intendment of law". See also People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373,
99 N. E. 841 (1912) ; and cf. rejection of what is practically Marshall's definition in Marshall v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 57 U. S. 314, 327 (1853). See I MoRAWErZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § I.
This author's rigid adherence to the fiction theory is admitted to
have been the motive for writing his classic treatise. In an oft quoted passage, he declares
that while the fiction of a corporate entity has important uses and cannot be dispensed with,
it is nevertheless ". . . essential . . . to bear in mind distinctly . . . that the rights
and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons
who compose it, and not of an imaginary being."
'Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. LIO at 119, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532 at
543 (1927): ". . . a corporation is more nearly a method than a thing . . . the law in
dealing with a corporation has no need of defining it as a person or an entity or even an
embodiment of functions, rights and duties but may treat it as a name for a useful and usual
collection
o.f jural relations ..
7
BERoLzErEIMER, THE WoRLD'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (1912) 370; this is the German
"association theory" advanced by Beseler and Gierke. Sir Frederick Pollock seems to
champion the same theory. PoLLocx, ESSAYS IN THE LAW (1922) 151 et seq.
'In Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 at 24, 51 Sup. Ct. 15 at 16 (1930)
Justice Holmes thus scores discussion, "it leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If
it is a fiction it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be acted on as true. The
corporation is a person and its ownership is a non-conductor that makes it impossible to
attribute an interest in its property to its members."
TIONS

NOTES

holders who own and control it.9 As surely as this doctrine exists, so surely
may it be asserted that courts under certain circumstances ignore the separate
individuality of a corporation and regard it as an association of persons. Generally speaking, this may be said to occur, as one court has phrased it,' 0 whenever
"the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime". A more detailed analysis of this broad field
would be impractical and could add nothing to the wealth of discussions thereon,
which the student of corporations already enjoys." But it is in the field of
taxation that the doctrine has been most prominently before the courts and with
our present day complex system of taxation it becomes most timely to inquire
whether the tendency of courts, in tax matters, to regard substance rather than
form has caused, in this field of law, a more frequent disregard of the corporate
entity, than is found in non-tax cases.
The student of the subject is confronted by a major obstacle in the fact
that every relevant case involves the construction of a tax statute, with the result,
in many instances, that what at first appears to be a judicial disregard of the
doctrine is, in fact, a judicial interpretation of a legislative disregard. A recent
Board of Tax Appeals decision,' 2 which at first blush appeared to be a shocking
departure from the doctrine, is illustrative. The Board upheld an income tax
imposed on the dividends received by a non-resident Englishman from an
English corporation, a large percentage of whose investments were in the United
States. The statute involved'13 taxed non-resident aliens on income derived
from sources within the United States. The Board, in holding that the source
of the Englishman's income was not the corporation but the corporate investments in the United States, declared that "it is clear that Congress regarded the
source of such earnings as being within the United States regardless of the
manner in which they might be removed, invested or distributed by the corporations subsequent to the first acquisition thereof within this country." Without
commenting on the correctness of this construction, the case is typical of
numerous others which have been classified by text-writers as exemplifying the
judicial "penetration of4the corporate veil" when in fact the decisions rested on
statutory construction.1
'Donnell v. Herring-Hall Marvin Safe Co., supra note i (contractual liability not that
of stockholders) ; Buffalo Loan, Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Medina Gas & Electric Co.,
362 N. Y. 67, 56 N. E. 5o5 (19oo) (title to corporate assets not in shareholders but in corporate entity) ; Boag v. Thompson, 2o8 App. Div. 132, 203 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1924) (rights
of legal action for injuries to corporation can only be exercised by corporation). See generally as to other rights attaching to the corporate entity BALLANTINE; FLETCHER; THrompSON, all loc. cit. mipra note 1.
'0United States v. Milwaukee Co., 142 Fed. 247, 255 (C. C. A. 7th, 39o5).
"BALLANTiNE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 6; 1 CooK, op. cit. supra note I, § 6; 1 FmHER,
op. cit. szpra, note I, 99 41-48; 1 THromPsoN, op. cit. supra note i, § IO; WORmsER, op. cit.
supra note 3, at I et seq.; see also Note (1911) I0 Mics. L. REv. 33o.
Forres et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. (decided January 13,
1932).

"43 STAT. 217 (a) 2 (925), 26 U. S. C. A. § 958 (a) 2 (1928).
" Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476, 39 Sup. Ct. 165 (919)
(three
justices dissenting) (in assessing value of shares in state bank, a portion of whose capital
was invested in National Bank stock, a deduction was granted to the extent of the value of
the National Bank stock on the ground that the right to tax National Bank stock was a
limited privilege and to refuse the reduction would be taxing the stock twice, i. e. as capital
of the state bank and as part of the shareholders interest since the statute regarded the
interests as substantially identical). Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d)
385 (1930) (a Wisconsin corporation, subsidiary of a New Jersey corporation, contracted
with the latter to sell automobiles manufactured by parent and provided that subsidiary's
income should not exceed $25oo annually, all excess to go to parent. Wisconsin taxed
subsidiary on its actual income regardless of contract, denied that any question of corporate
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In connection with this feature of the subject, it should be observed that
Congress has in several instances adopted legislation involving a disregard of
the corporate doctrine. The principle instances of this are (i) the exemption
from corporate taxation accorded "personal service" corporations---corporate
income being taxed directly to the stockholders; 15 (2) the requirement that
affiliated corporations, having substantially the same stockholders, file consolidated returns with a consequent effect on the amount of tax; 18 (3)the
imposition of a tax on corporate surplus, accumulated to avoid surtax, unless
shareholders include in their gross income their distributive shares, whether
distributed or not.' While it has been suggested that such legislative disregard
if carried too far may meet its limitations in the Fifth Amendment,' 8 no constitutional restrictions have apparently yet been defined, and if the view of Justice
Brandeis 19 is significant of the Supreme Court's position, the day when such
restrictions may be expected is far distant.
But aside from these decisions which rest on a legislative disregard of the
corporate entity, there are a number of cases in which the courts have definitely
considered the propriety of a similar judicial disregard. One of the earliest
attacks on the corporate doctrine was made in the classic case of Van Allen v.
The Assessors,2 0 in which corporate shareholders denied their liability for state
income tax on corporate dividends which represented earnings from tax-exempt
investments. The Supreme Court emphatically distinguished shareholder and
corporation, declaring them separate entities with interests totally distinct and
hence holding that the shareholder's interest, though ultimately from a taxexempt source, was subject to taxation. The doctrine thus enunciated supported
the Court's resistance to later attempts made to overthrow the corporate entity in
the cases of Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro2 and Eisner r.
Macomber.2 2 In the latter case the court took occasion to reassert vigorously
its attitude on the question.2 3 Undoubtedly, the practical result of this recogentity was involved, declaring that the purpose of the statute was to tax "actual income"
regardless of what might be contracted away). See also People ex rel. Studebaker Co. v.
Gilchrist, 244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68 (1926), in which construction of statute principally
concerned the court.
'1042
43 STAT. 254, § 201 (e) (924) ; 26 U. S. C. A. § 932 (e) (1928).
STAT. 319, § 1331 (1921) ; 26 U. S. C. A. lO67 (1928).
,745 STAT. 814, 26 U. S. C. A. § 23o4 (1928).
See Ballantine, Corporate Personality in
Income Taxation (1921)

34 HARV. L. REv. 573.

'Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 17, at 585; see also Ballantine, Some ConstitutionalAspects of the Excess Profits Tax (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 625.
'o In dissenting opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. 5. 189, at 231, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, at
202 (I92O), Justice Brandeis said: "No reason appears, why Congress, in legislating under

a grant of power so comprehensive as that authorizing the levy of an income tax, should
be limited by the particular view of the relation of the stockholder to the corporation and
its property which may, in the absence of legislation, have been taken by this court."
2D70 U. S. 573 at 583 (1865),
Justice Nelson speaking for the Court said, "The tax on
the shares is not a tax on the capital of the bank. The corporation is the legal owner of all
the property of the bank, real and personal . . . The interest of the shareholder entitles
him to participate in the net profits earned by the bank in the employment of his capital,
. . .in proportion to the number of his shares; . . . This is a distinct independent interest
or property held by the shareholder like any other property that may belong to him"; af'd,
in People v. The Commissioners, 71 U. S. 244 (1866).
2173 U. S.664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537 (1898) (state's right to tax shares in national bank does
not give right to tax franchises of bank, since latter are property of bank, while former are
property of shareholders, interests being distinct).
'Supra note 19.
'Ibid. at 213, 40 Sup. Ct. at 195: "We have no doubt of the power or duty of a court

to look through the form of the corporation and determine the question of the stockholder's
right, in order to ascertain whether he has received income taxable by Congress without
apportionment. But looking through the form, we cannot disregard the essential truth disclosed; ignore the substantial difference between corporation and stockholder; treat the
entire organization as unreal; look upon stockholders as partners when they are not such;
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nition of the separate entities is the liability to double taxation of what is substantially the same asset, 24 and this has been repeatedly held valid.2"
Encouraged however by the Supreme Court's admission of a "growing
tendency . . . in the Courts to look beyond the corporate form"

26

and again

in the Eisner v. Macomber case that there is "no doubt of the power or duty of
a court to look through the form of the corporation and determine the question
of the stockholders' right in order to determine whether he has received income
taxable by Congress",27 litigants continue to confront the courts with the problem. The vast bulk of the tax cases in which courts admittedly disavow the
corporate entity involve matters of fraud. The position of the courts in such
cases is consonant with the general judicial attitude toward fraud in non-tax
cases, for clearly where the corporate form is used as a device for fraud the
courts should not sanctify it by permitting it to enjoy the corporate attributes.
Hence, where a corporation is the means by which income is artificially limited,
the courts will not hesitate to "penetrate the veil" and administer substantial
justice. Typical of this principle is the Palmolive case 28 in which a Wisconsin
corporation transferred to a Delaware parent corporation practically all its assets
which the parent thereupon leased to the subsidiary. An inter-corporate contract
was then executed by which the Wisconsin corporation agreed to sell its entire
output to the Delaware corporation on a cost-plus percentage contract basis.
The District Court of Wisconsin held that this contract, being "unfair", was a
fraudulent evasion of the Wisconsin tax laws, thereby justifying a disregard of
29
the entity with a consequent apportionment of parent's income to subsidiary.
Similarly the entity will be ignored in other types of situations where it is the
means of tax law evasion. Thus where the two sole stockholders of a corporation sought to deduct as "necessary expense to preserve property" mortgage
interest which in fact was paid to themselves, the Court in refusing to allow
the deduction held that "Where the corporate form is used for the purpose of
evading the law, this court will not permit the legal entity to be interposed so as
to defeat justice." 30 The results reached in these types of cases do not show any
treat them as having in equity a right to the partition of the corporate assets, when they
have none; and indulge the fiction that they have received and realized a share Of the profits

of the company which in truth they have neither received nor realized."

" See BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra note I, at 25.
'Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S.134, 16 Sup. Ct. 456 (896) ; Illinois Nat.
Bank v. Kinsella, 201 Ill.
31, 66 N. E. 338 (1903) ; cf. Leland, The Relations of Federal,
State and Local Finance (1930) 23 PROCEEDnrGs OF THE NATIONAL TAx Ass'N 99 inwhich

Professor Leland interprets the recent expression by the Supreme Court that "Laws in

respect to taxation should be construed and applied with the view of avoiding, as far as
possible, any unjust consequences", in Farmers Loans & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S.
2o4, 5o Sup. Ct. 98 (I929)--as representing the Supreme Court's disapproval of double
taxation as well as an intent to curb itsexistence.
'In McCaskill v. United States, 216 U. S.504, 515, 30 Sup. Ct. 386, 391 (igio), Justice
McKenna speaks of "A growing tendency . . . exhibited in the Courts to look beyond the
corporate form to the purpose of it and to the officers who are identified with that purpose."
See Note (924) 72 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 158.
' Supra note 19, at 213, 40 Sup. Ct. at 195.
'Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. I93O). Buick Motor Co. v.
City of Milwaukee, supra note I4,and Cliffs Chemical Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Comm., 193
Wis. 295, 214 N. W. 447 (1927) are generally classified as in accord with the Palmolive
case, but the influence of statutory interpretation on these decisions was so great as not to
warrant such grouping in the opinion of the writer.
' For excellent discussion of this type of case and the problem involved, see Breckenridge,
Tax Escape Through Manipulation of Holding Companies (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. i89;
Huston, Allocation of Corporate Net Income for Purposes of Taxation (,932), 26 Il. L.
REv. 725; Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (ig3i) 44 HRv.L. Rsv.
935; Note (93) 31 CoL. L. REv. 719; Note (ig3i) 29 MicHa. L. REv.6oo.
" United States v. Barwin Realty Co., 25 F. (2d) oo3, at oo4 (E. D. N. Y. 1928);
see also Gardiner v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 225 Mass. 355, 114 N. E. 617 (1916);

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

more decided disregard of the corporate doctrine than in non-tax cases. It is
worthy of note that in either class fraudulent intent is apparently not requisite,
it being sufficient if the corporate form is de facto an instrument of fraud.,Certainly, little consideration is given to the presence or absence of fraudulent
intent in that line of tax evasion cases involving the lease of corporate propertywhere rent is payable directly to the stockholders. In those cases, the courts
while conceding that the right to the rent is the individual property of the stockholders for which they alone can recover,1 2 nevertheless regard the rent as taxable income of the corporation. 8 In reaching such a conclusion, it is clear the
courts have surmounted the corporate barrier and rendered their decisions on
the basis of the factual relation between stockholder and corporation (i. e. that
the rent so paid was a corporate dividend) as distinguished from .the theoretical,
legal relation.84
In addition to these, which may be generally classified as the "fraud cases",
in two other notable situations has the force of the doctrine been assailed. The
first arose under the Revenue Act of 1913, which taxed corporate earnings to
the stockholder only when declared as dividends.3 5 In 1914 a subsidiary corporation, of which its parent was sole stockholder declared a dividend in the
surplus which had been accumulating over a period of years prior to the effective
date of the statute. Holding that the corporate earnings of the subsidiary had
substantially accrued to the parent by virtue of the substantial identity of the
two corporations, prior to the effective date of the statute, the Supreme Court
declined to permit their taxation.36 While it is true that the effect of the decision
was limited to the "peculiar facts" of the case, where such facts recur the Court
may be expected to maintain its position as it did a year later when a similar
case arose.37 This may be definitely classified as an instance where the "power
Cliffs Chemical Co. v. Wisconsin Tax. Comm., supra note 28; cf. Commonwealth v. Muir,
17o Ky. 435, 186 S. W. 194 (1916) where court refused to disregard corporate entity because
disregard was sought to evade tax laws.
"eople ex rel. Att'y Gen'l v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 246 Mich. i9, 224 N. W. 438
(1929) ; see cases cited supra notes 28 and 3o in which no inquiry as to intent is made;
i FirE-ctE, op. cit. supra note i, § 45.
' Aetna Insurance Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co., 156 Fed. I32 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) ; Bowers
v. Interborough Rapid .Transit Co., 121 Misc. 250, 2O N. Y. Supp. 198 (I923), aff'd, 208

App. Div. 768, 202 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1924).

'West End Ry. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. ist, 1917) ; Resselaer v. Irwin, 249
Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); American Tel. & Cable Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 326
(1925). But see United States v. Western Union, 5o F. (2d) io2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), Note

(1931) 41 YAIE L.

J.

130.

"' Curiously enough it has been suggested that these cases which the courts explicitly
put on the ground of fraud do not really have such a basis. HOLMES, FEDERAL TAx (6th
ed. 1925) .23o, n. 67.
338 SrAT. 166.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330 at 337, 38 Sup. Ct. 540 at 542 (1917). The
two corporations, said the Court, "were in substance identical because of the complete ownership and control which the latter possessed over the former, as stockholder and in other
capacities. While the two companies were separate legal entities, yet in fact, and for all
practical purposes they were merged, the former being but a part of the latter, acting merely
as its agent and subject in all things to its proper direction and control." But see Lynch v.
Hornby, 247 U. S.339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543 (1917) ; Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S.221, 38 Sup.
Ct. 537 (1917); Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S.347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546 (1917); all three being
decided at same time.
' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S.71 at 72, 39 Sup. Ct. 35 (19I8); said the Court:
"It is true that petitioner and its subsidiaries were distinct beings in contemplation of law,
but the facts that they were related as parts of one enterprise, . . .that the debts were all
enterprise debts, . . .and that the dividends represented earnings that had been made in
former years and that practically had been converted into capital, unite to convince us that
the transaction should be regarded as bookkeeping rather than as 'dividends declared and
paid in the ordinary course by a corporation.'"
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of the courts" was exercised to scrutinize the substantial composition of the
affiliated corporations and ignore the non-conductivity of the corporate form in
reaching its result. However, an emphatic reluctance to extend by analogy or
otherwise the departure thus made has been manifest in subsequent cases.38
The second situation arises under corporate reorganization where Corporation A forms Corporation B to which all of A's assets are transferred; the stock
of B is then distributed to the shareholders of A, and A is either dissolved or
continues with diminished assets and functions. Each shareholder, after the
exchange, has an interest in the two corporations (or in the new one alone, if
the old is dissolved) which is of precisely the same value as that which he had
before the transfer, and consequently is reluctant to admit any taxable gain by
the receipt of the newly issued stock, because of the substantial identity of the
two corporations. In five leading cases 39 has this situation confronted the
Supreme Court with results that are only reconcilable by the most subtle distinctions. The source of the uncertainty is the Eisner v. Macomber case which
is, in a sense, a paradoxical decision in that it vigorously asserts the separateness
of corporation and shareholder 4 and at the same time assaults formalism in
holding that a stock dividend is not income because:
"The essential and controlling fact is that the stockholder has received
nothing out of the Company's assets for his separate use and benefit; on
the contrary every dollar of his original investment together with whatever
accretions and accumulations have resulted from employment of his money
and that of the other stockholders in the business of the Company still remains the property of the Company and subject to business risks which may
result in wiping out the entire investment. Having regard to the very
truth of the matter, to substance and not to form, he has received nothing
that answers to the definition of income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment." 41
The inescapable logic manifested in this quotation has haunted the Court in
the five decisions mentioned, but its effect has not been uniform. In United
States v. Phelli, 42 the earliest of these cases, a New Jersey corporation with a
considerable surplus formed a Delaware corporation with capitalization equal
to the capital and surplus of the New Jersey concern. The latter then transferred all its assets to the Delaware company, whose stock was received in exchange. Of the stock so received part was used to retire outstanding bonds,
part retained as treasury stock and the balance distributed among the shareholders of the New Jersey corporation. The net effect of the exchange was
that each original stockholder of the New Jersey stock for each of his former
shares (valued at $795 a share) now had one snart of the New Jersey corporation stock (valued at $Ioo a share) and two shares of the Delaware Corporation
stock (valued at $347.50 a share). But while each shareholder before and after
the transfer thus had holdings of the same value, the corporate barrier was
respected and the newly issued stock was taxed to the shareholders. The same
'United States v. Phila. B. & W. R. R., 262 Fed. 188 (E. D. Pa. 192o) (court refused

to follow Lowe case, explaining that corporations involved did not have the substantial identity of those in the Lowe case) ; James v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. (1928) (Board refused
to regard earnings of subsidiary as earnings of parent until distributed to parent, distinguishing facts of Lowe case). See, on related problem, (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 458.
'Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U. S.176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68 (1921) ; United States v.
Phellis, 257 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63 (1921) ; Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U. S. 134, 43 Sup.
Ct. 495 (1923); Weiss v. Steam, 285 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), aff'd, 265 U. S. 242,
44 Sup. Ct. 490 (1924) ; Marr v. United States, 268 U. S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575 (1925).
40
Supra note 23.
Supra note 19, at 211, 40 Sup. Ct. at 194.
'"
Supra note 39.

41
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conclusion was reached in Rockefeller v. United States,4 where two corporations
were formed each to conduct a branch of a former single business, and in
Cullinan v. Walker 44 where the assets of a Texas corporation were similarly
split between two new corporations which issued stock and bonds in payment
for the transfer; this stock was transferred to a holding corporation whose stock
was then issued to the shareholders of the original Texas corporation in proportion to their holdings. But in Weiss v. Stern 45 the Court yielded to the substantial facts in a similar reorganization; the officers, shareholders and assets in
both corporations were the same; both were incorporated in the same state
with presumably the same powers. These corporations, the Court at last conceded, were identical; the separate entities were mere forms, and by the issuance
of the new stock there was no taxable gain to the shareholder. One year later,
however, in Marr v. United States,4 a case identical with Weiss v. Stearns
except for the two facts that the old and new corporations were chartered in
different states and that the stock of the corporations had different characteristics though representing the same interests, it was held that the substantial
identity necessary for the result of the Weiss case was precluded by the existence
of these points of difference.47 The four justices who dissented found the two
cases indistinguishable.4" It would be presumptuous to venture a generalization
as to this group of cases. 49 It is sufficient to note that the Supreme Court in the
Marr case and the Federal Courts since 50 have shown no eagerness to follow
the Weiss case, which may be clearly acknowledged as an instance in which the
corporate entity was disregarded, to prevent the honest use of the corporate
form from being the occasion for an inequitable imposition of taxes.5 A conservative conclusion, however, may be drawn from the cases, that in corporate
reorganization the courts may disregard the entity but that such disregard will
be a rare exception to a jealously protected rule which preserves the separate
corporate individuality.
In a third type of case has the integrity of the entity doctrine been challenged, but, unlike the other two, the effort here has apparently met with failure.
'3Ibid.
,4Ibid.
15Ibid.
10Ibid.
' It is difficult to understand why the fact that the charters were issued in different states
should be a controlling factor, as this was apparently ignored as a point of difference in the
Rockefeller case supra note 39, at 183, 42 Sup. Ct. at 70, in which the Court said: "The facts
are in all essentials indistinguishable from those presented in the Phellis Case", although in
the latter the corporations were in different states while in the Rockefeller case they were in
the same state.
' It may be significant to note that Brandeis and Holmes were among the four dissenting
justices in Eisner v. Macomber; that McReynolds and Van Devanter dissented in the
Phellis and Rockefeller cases, and were joined in their further dissent in the Marr case by
Sutherland and Butler; that McReynolds delivered the opinion in the Weiss case to which
Brandeis and Holmes dissented, and that Brandeis delivered the opinion in the Marr case.
" These cases are thoroughly discussed and compared in Note (1926) 20 ILL. L. R.Ev.
6oi (in which the writer presents a logical reconciliation of them) ; see also Note (1924) 73
U. OF PA. L. REv. 83; Note (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 319.
'Wright v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5o F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931);
United States v. Siegel, 52 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) ; cf. Petree v. United States, 34

F. (2d) .56.3 (E. D. Tenn. 1928) ; Insurance and Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 36 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ; Allen v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 49 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
" The significance of these cases, for purposes of federal income tax, has been somewhat
diminished by the last Revenue Act which has prescribed exemptions in a number of instances
arising under corporate reorganization.

See HoLmEs, op. cit. supra note 34, chapters 12 and

17 for thorough study of the recent Revenue Act in connection with the corporate doctrine.
The same considerations attend the incorporation of a partnership where the partners
become the sole stockholders. Heafey v. Allen, 34 F. (2d) 941 (D. Neb. 1929) ; DarbyLynde Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 51 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. ioth, 1931).
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The situation is presented when an attempt is made to tax a foreign parent corporation, by virtue of the presence of a subsidiary corporation within the taxing
jurisdiction. Although in the several cases where the issue was raised, the tax
was declared invalid, in each case the court expressed the opinion that had the
subsidiary corporation been without any autonomy, a different result would
have been reached.5 2 While this really raises a jurisdictional problem in which
type of litigation the corporate doctrine has been frequently in issue,5 3 the consequences of a disregard of the entity in order to extend the taxing power of a
uttered in these
state are exceedingly widespread, and the possibility of the dicta
5 4
cases developing into decisions may be watched with interest.
The extent to which the courts have gone in ignoring the corporate individuality, in the situations discussed, marks the extreme of the judicial inroads
on the corporate doctrine. The situations concerned admittedly were unique and
the judicial capitulation to the demands therein made for substantial equity
rather than the artificial justice which a blind observance of the entity theory
would produce, does not represent any more pronounced tendency to escape the
doctrine than is displayed in non-tax cases. In the latter sphere, avoidance or
redress of frauds, 55 substantial identity of affiliated corporations 56 or evasion
of the law 7 have repeatedly been the occasions for what the courts have frankly
termed a disregard of the corporate entity. That such circumstances should
have the same effect in tax cases is but a logical application of the principles
involved. What further departure from the rigidity of the corporate doctrine
courts will be compelled to make by the intrinsic merits of future cases must
remain a matter of conjecture, for it must ever be remembered that the corporate doctrine is a creature of the law, and as such its life, vigor and limitations
depend on the legislature and judiciary giving it such protection as is consonant
with their duty not to permit a creature of the law to be an instrument of
injustice.
J. E. G..,Jr.
I Procter & Gamble v. Newton, supra note 5; People ex tel Studebaker Co. v. Gilchrist,
supra note 14.

Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy, 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 25o (1925) ; Selbert v. Lancaster Chocolate & Caramel Co., 23 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ; (ownership by foreign
corporation of stock in domestic corporation does not give state of domestic corporation

jurisdiction over foreign corporation) ; In re Green's Estate, 231 N. Y. 237, 131 N. E. goo
(1921) (non-resident by owning stock in New York corporation does not do business in
New York for purposes of inheritance tax) ; see generally on jurisdiction to tax Cannon
Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy, supra note 53; GOODiCH, CONFLIcr OF LAws (1927) §4o et seq.;
Note (192s) 20 ILu. L. Rav. 281.
I' The doctrine is also frequently attacked when a parent corporation advances money to
a subsidiary and seeks to deduct the advance as necessary operating expense. The exemption
is usually refused. Walker v. Gulf & I. Ry. of Texas, 269 Fed. 88.5 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921) ;
Nixon v. Lucas, 42 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), (i93i) 44 HARV. L. REV. 467. But
"advances" made by a subsidiary (which declared no dividends) to parent as "loans", have
been held not income of parent. Matter of Fox Film Co. v. Laughman, 233 App. Div.
58, 251 N. Y. Supp. 693, (1931) 45 HARv. L. Ray. 391.

re Auditore's Administratrix, 223 App. Div. 654, 229 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1928);
nln
Lowenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 259 Ill. App. 612 (13); see Jenkins v.
Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930).
' Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 72o (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) (valuable collection of authorities) ; Gates Rubber Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 45 F. (2d) 652 (D. Col.
1930); Conway v. Citrus Belt Land Co., 271 Pac. 525 (Cal. 1928); Old Ben Coal Co. v.
Universal Coal Co., 248 Mich. 486, .227 N. W. 794 (1929) ; this type of case can generally
be explainedon principles of agency, although courts speak of "disregarding the entity".
"United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R, 22.U. S.257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387 (1911) ; State
v. Safford, H17 Ohio 576, 159 N. E. 829 (1927).

